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FACTOR PROPORTIONS, PUBLIC FINANCES,
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS ON LABOR RESOUliCES,
A TEST AND REFORMULATION OF
DOMAR'S HYPOTHESIS ON SLA VERY Oli SERFDOM
Mario H. Pastore
ABSTRACT
Relative labor scarcity and land abundance were contributing causes of agricultural
slavery or serfdom that Damar correctly empha~ized. but he predicted that private and
public agents as well a<; population factors would play different roles in the rise and fall of
those forms of coerced labor than they did in colonial Paraguay. A more satisfactory.
endogenous acoount of the influence of those factors can be obtained by reformulating the
hypothesis in property rights and rent-seeking terms. In the process, the particular
progression and ethmc characteristics of the agrarian c1a~s structure and land tenure system
III that peripheral Spanish colony are also clanfied.
FACfOR P!WrORTlONS, PUAUC FINANCES, AND
PROI'UnV RIGHTS ON lABOR RESOURCES:
A TEST Al':D REFORMUIATloNOF DOMAR'S HVrOnrES[S
ON Su. VERY OR SEHFOOM
The causes of slavery or serfdom - Damar contended - may be found in
relative factor scarcity and government intervention, which between 1550 and 1650
led to the bonding of a previously free Russian peasantry.} Given that similar
relative factor supplies and forms of coerced and free labor also arose at roughly tbe
same time but not in the same sequence in a number of peripheral Spanish and
Portuguese colonies in America, I propose to test Domar's hypothesis by verifying
whether its predictions are consistent with the experience of a roughly
representative Spanish colony, Paraguay.2 I will summarize the hypothesis in
section one, briefly describe the forms of coerced and free labor that arose in the
test case in section two, contra~t the hypothesis' implications with the empirical
record in section three, and reformulate certain aspects of the hypothesis so that it is
consistent with the case study in section four. Ideally, the reformulated hypothesis
should then be tested against the history of Paraguay, the other peripheral colonies,
and the regions Domar considered. For space liniltatiuns. however, I wil1limit
myself to suggesting, in section five, certain areas where theoretical expectations
derived from the reformulated hypthesis and the record of Paraguay are consistent
one with the other.
1. A free peasantry will arise. Damar argued, if land is abundant and
competition for laborers among employers is free. Assuming only two factors, labor
1. Ev:sey Damar, "The Cau~c~ of Slavery and .scrfo.lom; A Hypothcsi~: Jounra/ of Ecollomic
His/ory, J<) (March 1970), pp. 18·32.
2. For a description of tfJese peripfJcral areas, see Jamcs LockfJart and Stuart .schw<lrt:r, Early
La/ill Amcn'ca (Cilmhriu!lc; Camhridge University Prcss, 19.'13), pp. 253-.104.
and abundant land of even fertility, the marginal product of labor will be conSl:mt
and equal ID the aVCT;tge product. Competition among employers will drive wage
rales up until they equal the marginal product of labor and, therefore, all output will
be paid oul to lahorers as wages. Land will not earn rent. Given that landowners
will not hire lahorers unless rents are positive, and that l:lborers will not hire
themselves out for less than they can earn working easily obtainable land of lheir
own, family size farms fairly equally distributed in size will emerge. The
government may raise reventles by taxing the peasantry directly or indirectly, but not
by taxing land rents. Economic forces alone, without government interference. will
shape the institutional structure. Restricting the right to own land will not
significantly alter this result: laborers will now work for a wage, but competition
among employers will keep wages high as a proportion of total output. Extending
the number of factors to three will leave the results largely unaltered, so long as
land is abundant and competition is unhindered. The colonial and nineteenth
century U.S. North exemplifies this case.
Serfdom or slavery will arise when labor is scarce relative to land and, in
addition, governments intervene to tie laborers to "employers" for, perhaps, a public
finance rationale: eliminating employers' competition for laborers allows employers
to appropriate the marginal product of labor above a subsistence minimum, surplus
from which they can support themselves and equip armies needed to wage war
against other states. Tying land will not accomplish the same result. for reasons
already explained. It is worth noting here that Domar regarded serfdom and slavery
as equivalent and used both terms interchangeably.
The demise of slavery is, for Damar, more certain in a traditional eco'nomy
than in one where technological innovation is commonplace. More relevant for our
purposes is a traditional economy where, according to Damar, slavery ends as a
result of a Malthusian mechanism: population growth leads to a fall in the marginal
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product of lahor and "Now the free man costs little more to employ thao the slave,
while hopefully being lc~s bothersome and more productive. The ownership of
human beings becomes pointless because of the great multiplic.\tion ofsl.wes and
they become free ...".3 An increasing population turns land scarce. Estates worked
by free laborers or tenants without any non-economic compulsion can now produce
land rents that ths state may tax to, for example, support an army.
The U.S. South's experience with slavery fits the hypothesis "with
embarrassing simplicity," Domar thought, and so does the onset of serfdom in
Russia and Poland-Lithu;lnia, as well as serfdom's onset and its 13th century demise
in Western Europe. Damar could not. however, account for the non-recurrence of
serfdom in Western Europe after the Black Death in tenns of a switch to less labor
intensive techniques (sheep farming), and reluctantly attributed it to exogenous
political factors. The population decline could have been uneven across estates, he
argued, forcing landowners who had lost comparatively more serfs to favor freedom
of peasant movement and those that had lost fewer serfs to oppose it. Disunited
landowners could not pressure the government to do their bidding and opened the
way for others to do so. Thus, the pressure behind legislation in Richard II's
England may not have come from feudal landowners but from "smaller" man. In
general. in an economy with scarce labor and abundant land of uniform quality
there will never simultaneously exist free land. free pe;L~ants and non-working land
owners, although any two of them will. Which combination is found d-:pends on the
government.
2. Paraguay's early colonial economy was first characterizeu by
American Indian slavery and, from the mid 1550's, by two versions of a form of
serfdom, the "encomienda mitaria" and "encomienda yanacona," which replaced
3. Domar, -CIUSCS (Or Slavery or Scrrdnm: p. 2.1.
)
slavery. The cncomiendas were royal grants of Indian labor to wonhy Spaniards
("encomendcros"), who were supposed to unden'lke at their own cxpense measures
rcquired to protect, convert, and acculturate their Indian charges, render military
service to defend the colony, and pay certain money taxes to the Royal Treasury.4
In exchange, the encomenderos would collect for themselves in temporary labor
services the tax Indians would otherwise have paid the King.S Indians subjected to
the encomienda mitaria were confined 10 towns and took turns providing l:lbor
services, usually for two months at a time, on the houses, ranches and plantings of
their encomenderos. Once their service was completed Indians would return to the
towns where they were confined and another contingent would serve in their stead.
Indian.s SUbjected to encomiendas yanaconas did not live in their own towns but with
the encomenderos to whom they were entrusted. and served continuously rather
than by turns. Both forms of the encomienda had declined noticeably by the 1630's,
but the stagnant encomiendas and the "pueblos de indios" confining "mita" Indians
nevertheless persisted throughout the colonial period. Alongside the est.ltes worked
with encomienda labor and the pueblos de indios there arose a progressively more
important guarani-speaking, mestizo free peasantry, whose family-size farms spread
particularly rapidly in the last decades of colonial rule. A more detailed description
fol1ows.
Indigenous slavery appeared early in Spain's colonization of Paraguay.
Tribes of the area west of the Paraguay River were a threat to both the Spanish
seeking to reach Peru and the guarani-speaking tribes of the Asuncion area.
Mutually beneficial Spanish-Indian alliances were formed and joint westward
expeditions produced numerous captives that were divided up as slaves among the
4. James Schofield Saeger, ·Survival and Ah(1liti(1n; The Eightecnth Century Paraguayan
Encnmiemla: nle Amen·cas. Vol. 28, (July 81), pp. 59-85.
5. Carlos Pastore, La luella poI/a riefTQ ell cf PUIUA'lUY (M(1ntcvidco: Editorial Antcqucra,
19"72), p. 12.
Spaniards and their Indian allies. These alliances were cemented in the customary
indigenous manner, that is, by the polygamous marital unions of Spanish men and
Indian women, whom the Spaniards treated as slaves and traded freely among
themselves. From these "marriages" arose a mestizo population, about which more
will be said later, and kinship ties between Spaniards, Indians, and mestizos.
Kinship had regulated the provision of voluntary, reciprocal labor services among
indigenous tribes and temporarily served the same purpose between Spaniards and
Indians. The "cunadazgo," however, soon became a vehicle for exacting coerced
indigenous labor. Open enslavement of friendly Indians followed the realization
that Peru would not be reached through the River Plate. Resigned to staying in
Paraguay, the Spaniards raided friendly Indian settlements in search of slaves.
These "rancheadas" sought Indian women in particular, because of their skill as
cultivators, and formally stretched unti11555.6
Enslavement, flight, and disease rapidly lowered the indigenous population,
which in turn moved the colonial administration to do away with Indian slavery and
substitute for it the less severe encomiendas. Royal officials finally managed to
impose them in 1556, when the Provincial governor assigned in encomiendas
mitarias 27,000 able-bodied, adult Indian males (equivalent to a population of
100,000) among a fraction of the Spaniards in Asuncion. Mita Indians were also
subject to the "congregacion: a policy that involved resettling mita Indians in
segregated "pueblos de indios" to which Spaniards were denied access.7
Entrustment could and did take place independently of resettlement, especially in
the heginning. In fact, the first permanent Indian towns were founded in the
6. Branislava Su~nik, £/ itrdiocofOllia/ del Paraguay. Vol. t, £1 guarani colonial (Asuncion
Musco Elnografico Andres Barhem, 19(5). ' •
7. On the congregacion sec E. Bradford Burns, Latin America, a concise ill/erpretive history
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 36.
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1580's.8 Those "recalcitrant" Indians who refused to submit to entrustment could be
forced to do so in "just wars" waged to that effect, that is, could be enslaved. Kept
under close supervision in the homes and farms of Spaniards, these slaves could not,
however, be freely traded by their owners and had to firs! revert to the crown hefore
being reassigned to another Spaniard, a characteristic of the encomiend:l mitaria as
well. They came to be regarded as belonging to another encomienda, the
encomienda "yanacona," which thus disguised and prolonged slavery in a restricted
fnrmY
The "new" system did not work well. The encomenderos abused their
privileges and shirked their contractual obligations. For example, they shifted mita
Indians to the encomienda yanacona and evaded military service by purchasing
government offices exempting their holders from it.10 Encomendero abuses and
other reasons attributable to the institution of the encomiendas contributed to the
continued decline of the indigenous population. Three successive sets of royal
ordinances noted the abuses and legislated against them, but there was no reprieve
for the Guarani Indians until the Jesuits began to found mission towns southeast of
Asuncion in the 161O's.11 Thus, the indigenous population appeared to have been
reduced to a fraction of its original size by the early seventeenth century.12
8. See Margarita Duran Strago, Presencia Frallcisctllla en el Paraguay: 1538... 1824 (A~uncion:
Univer~idad Catohca, 1987) pp. 93-t64.
9. Silvio Zavala, Origenes de fa coloniUlciOfl en el Rio tit fa Plafa (Mexico: El Colcgio
Nacional, 1m).
10. James S. Saeger, ·Survival and Abolition,· p. 74.
11. See J ulio Ce~ar Chaves, "Las ordenanzas de Ramirez de Velasco, Hernandarias, y Alfaro:
Historia Paraguaya 13 (1969-70), pp. 107-120. and Alberto Armani, Cil/dad de Dios y Cil/dad del Sol. £1
"estado"jcsuila de los gllaranies (1609·1769), (Mexico, fondo de Cultura Ewnomica, t9H().
12. For a lower hound estimate see Adalberto Lopez. "Shiphuilding in Sixteenth CenlUry
Asuncion del Paraguay; Mariller's Minvr, til, No.1 (Feb. 1975). p. 31-37, and for an upper hound
e~timate see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Mercado ,il/emo y eCOIlOm/a COIO/lful, (Mcul,:o, Edilorial Grijalbo,
t9H3).
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Attempts were now made to extem! the encomienda 10 mestizos and to introduce
African slaves, but they were generally unsuccessful because of legal prohibitions.
Thereafter. the encomienda de la mila· although still valuable - languished. 1J
The rest of the seventeenth and the carly eighteellth centuries were market!
by economic contraction and absence of immigration. The decimated Indian
population had ~Y now been "reduced" to Indian towns as wel1. 14 Over the now
vacant lands they had occupied family-size farms owned by mestizo, guarani-
speaking peasant proprietors began to spread, more rapiJly after trade in
agricultural products increased in the later eighteenth aOl..I early nineteenth
centuries. 15 Greater production of yerba mate in the north ami tobacco in the east
increased the demand for land, and so did the yerba-derived demand for cattle,
which became particularly acute after the Borbonic liberalization of trade of the
1770'5.16 Land prices rose, land rents appeared, and mestizos encroached upon the
lands of the pueblos de indios. Wages rose as well, landless peasants migrated to
I . I I . .. b d 17the more rapidly growing areas, and a re alive y arge ImmigratIOn was a serve .
The greater demand for land and labor helped expand the land frontier and
increase the relative importance of the stratum of small peasant proprietorships.
13. See Alberto Armani, ClIidad de Dios YCiudad del Sol; Adalherto Lope7~ "Shipbuilding...;
pp. 31-37·, and Rafael Eladio Vela7.qucZ, "La Poblacion del Paraguay en 1682,· Revis/a ParagrUlya de
Sociologia, Vol. 9, No. 24 (Mayo·Agosto), Pl'. 128-148, respectively.
14_ See Rafael Eladio Vela7_que7~ ·Caracteres de la encomienda paraguaya en los siglos XVII
yxvm," Hisloria Paragl/ay XIX, pp. 115-163.
15. See Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Mcrr:ado ;,rlcnro yewflonria colOllial, pp. 353-379, and
ECO/lomia, sOelcdady regiOlles (Buenos Aires, Edicioncs de la Flor, 1987) pp. 193-260.
10. See Jerry W. Cooney, "The Yerha Male and Cattle Frontier of Paraguay, 1776-181 t:
Social Economic, and Politieallmpacl,· (ms) 1987; "Bureaucrats. Growers, and Ddense: Tho;: Royal
Tobacco Monopoly of Paraguay," (ms) 19f17. For the laIc eighteenth century boom see Jerry W.
Cooney, "An Ignored Aspect orlhe Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata," IIrtcrc(lmbio In/cmacioll(ll, Vo!.
2, No.1 (January 1977), pp. 10-13.
17. Sec Rcnc Ferrer <ie ArreHaga, U,t sififo de expansion r::%Jlizadora: lo.! Origt'I1t'I de
CQ/rcepciml, (Asuncion, 19~5); Jerry W. Cooney, "Foreigners in the lntendencia of Paraguay,· TIre
Americas, Vol. XXXIX (1<J82-R3), pp. 333·351\, respectively.
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Thc Borhonic reforms, in addition, encouraged lhe dcvelopment ofslate
enterprises, whose demand for indigenous labor revived a seventeenth century
colonial administration policy to grant no new encomicndas <lnd force vacnnt ones
to revert to the crown. 1S The system continued to function along these lines and
was finally abolished in 1812, after Independence,
3, Factor supplies did obtain in Par<lguay in the proportions
hypothesized by Domar. 19 Furthermore, indigenous slavery appeared even though
the demand for slave labor arose from the production requirements of what was
essentially a subsistence, not an export, economy. Slavery, however, did not result
from intervention by Ihe colonial administration. On the contrary, the crown pressed
to end indigenous slavery and institute the encomiendas in its slead and,
furthermore, legally abolished indigenous slavery in the middle of the sixteenth
century (except in cases of just wars). In Paraguay, it appears, indigenous slavery
was brought about by private entrepreneurs who, at their O\Vf1 expense, applied the
military coercion necessary for its enforcement and reproduction. Labor scarcity
also promoted the introduction of the encomiendas, which did require direct
government intervention inspired by public finance considerations of the sort
Damar suggested. Therefore, Domar's contention that slavery requires direct
government intervention is not born olll, but his hypothesis that serfdom does is.
However, Domar regards government behavior as an exogenous, political variable
and would leave a full explanation of its behavior to political scientists. Thus,lhe
hypothesis insufficiently specifies the role of government.
18. See Jerry w. Coon~y, "A Colonial Naval Industry: The Fahrica de Cables of Paraguay,"
Revisw de Hi:rlnria dl' AmeriC(l,!l7 (Enero.lunio 191')) and "ParaglJ~yanASlilleros and the Platine
Merchant Marine, 17%-1806,' 17w His/orio/I, ]'180, pp. 55·74; for the e~chcaling of encomicnda to the
crown, see Saeger, ·Survival and Abolition," p. 77.
19. See Elm;m R. Service, SpalliIlr Guaralli Rdatirms ilr Early ColOlrial Paraguay,
(Westport, CT, 1'154).
Serfdom or slavery would dis'lppear as a result of population growlh, Danlar
posited, although he <lid not suggest what forces consistent with lhe logic of a sl'lve
or feudal economy would bring this growth about. In fact, indigenolls slavery
produced a population decrease that did not Slap when the encomiendas were
instituted and eventu::l1ly led to the dwindling of their sources of supply and
consequent stagnation. This negative population effect is onc thaI Domar's
hypothesis makes no provision for. Furthermore, onc would have expected lhe
encomiendas in Paragllay to have been extended to the growing mestizo population
at this point, just as Damar expected serfdom in Europe to recur after the Black
Dcath. However, although attempts in this direction were made, no such extension
is observed. Finally, rather than ending because labor becomcs plentiful and cheap,
the encomienda mitaria seems to have been abolished in the context of a general
labor shortage and increasing wages. Thus, Damar's hypothesis appears to be
inconsistent with the encomiendas' abolition.
That out of slavery and serfdom a free peasantry should have arisen poses
another problem for Domar's hypothesis, since it suggested that a free peasantry
would precede serfdom or slavery. Moreover, the hypothesis suggested that slavery
or serfdom would disappear through a population increase that would render lahar
abundant, land scarCf-, and would make it worthwhile for landlords to fire their
slaves and hire free laborers; assuming that the growing bonded population owns no
assets and is freed because it becomes abundant relative to land, which becomes
comparatively scarce, one would expect it to be transformed into a free wage labor
force, not the free peasantry that flourished in Paraguay. Furthermore, the
particular ethnic characteristics exhibited by the Paraguayan peasantry requires an
explanation, which the hypothesis cannot provide because it was not built for that
purpose.
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4. In general, well-defined and enforced private properly righls will
allow rents accruing to scarce resources to be captured by their owners, while
commonly owned resources will be overexploited and the rents that would otherwise
accrue to them will he dissipated, as in the classic case of the fisheries.20 This
analysis applies to all resources, labor resources included. Given abuntlant, evenly
ferlile land and unhindered competition among employers a free peasantry will
emerge, provided private properlY rights over all resources -including one's O\vn
labor· are well defined and are enforced hy the government. If so, even if the right
to own land in private property is restricted to a certain sector of the population,
slavery or serfdom do not result, as Damar points oui. On the other hand, if the
government fails to enforce or differentially enforces private property rights over
lahor, it is obvious that slavery is a possible outcome. The different results are
clearly due to the alternative delineation and enforcement of property rights by the
government. Thus, government intervention appears to be as much of a
requirement for the rise of a free peasantry, or of a class of landowners and a class
of rural wage laborers, as it is for the rise of serfdom. Conversely, government
intervention does not seem a necessary condition for slavery, which private
associations may be sufficient to impose and enforce. This is exemplified in the
particular case under study. The Spanish kings owned the land and labor resources
by Papal decree, hut did not or could not rigidly enforce their property rights.
Consequently, individual Spaniards initially regarded the indigenous people as a
common property resource and exploited their labor as they would have exploited
any other such resource; unsurprisingly, the outcome was not a free peasantry but
indigenous slavery and depopulation. In fact, by not enforcing its property rights
over indigenous labor and letting private entrepreneurs enslave Indians, the crown
20. H. Scott (jordoo, "Economic Theory ofComm\1o Pwperly Resources: Journal of Poli,ical
Economy, (t%5).
allowed the private rate of return to exceed the sodal ratc of return, thus increasing
the incentives for priv~llc Spaniards to colonize the New World at the expense of
depleting indigenous labour resource. The analogy between ocean fishing and slave
hunting may ohviously be applied fruitfully to American Indian slavery in Paraguay
as well.Zl
Take now Jhc encomiemlas. The encroachment of private enslavers on royal
labor resources ;nd the resulting depopulation would eventually have depleted the
tax paying indigenous population and dissipated the rents accruing to it. To put an
end to this waste of resources the crown had to intervene and reassert its own
property rights over the scarce labor, excluding private encroachers. It did so by
means of the policy of congregacion, which confined Indians to towns and severely
restricting Spaniards' access to these towns. However, to capture some of the labor
rents for itself, however, the crown had to, additionally, sell or lease the reclaimed
rights to private agents, or, alternatively, itself use the labor resources in royal
enterprises. Selling royal rights would simply have given rise to unrestricted
indigenous slavery, which had been legally ruled out in the middle of the sixteenth
century. Leasing the rights over a period of years, on the other hand, would not
have violated existing laws. Leasing the rights full time over a period of years gave
rise to the encomienda yanacona, while leasing them for part of the year over a
period of years gave rise to the encomienda mitaria. Leasing, however, created
incentives for encomenderos to depreciate the resource during the term of the grant
and, conversely, made it necessary for the crown to devise some rules of resource
use and means by which to enforce resource use in accordance with the rules in
question. In other words. the encomiendas mitarias created an agency problem.
21. Robert P. ThlJm,,~ ami Richard Bean, "The Fi~her~ of Men: The Profits of the Slave
Trade: Joumal of £COllomir His/ory, Vol. 34 (t974), pp. &'i5-9t4.
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111is analysis is consistent with a rem-seeking view of mercantilist states
which asserlS thai such states raise revenues hy supplying rent-creating monopoly
rights at prices renecting the monarch's <lbilily to price discriminate. The poorer
and closer to the fronlier was a colony, the greater the crown's incentives to lease ils
rights over Indian labor to private agents, since the low lahar productivity of the
indigenous population meant that the monetary yiekl of taxes they paid in kind
would likely he lower than the costs of tax collection, let alone the costs of
defending the colony. On the other hand, the crown's incentives to reclaim the
labor resources it bad leased rose in the late eighteenth century, when the costs of
defense abated, the crown promoted state enterprises, and wages went up.
Predictably, the colonial administration chose to reclaim royal rights over lahor and
itself use Indian labor in slate enterprises.
One may conclude, therefore, that the encomiendas intended to regulate the
slavery that had arisen from the free play of maximization aims in the context of
private property rights not clearly defined and enforced. The encomiendas aimed at
preserving the royal slack of Indian laborers, and at increasing the crown's share of
the surplus over subsistence that private users of indigenous labor extracted, that is,
at changing the distribution of income that resulted from the institutional
arrangemenl~ proper of slavery. This required new institutional arrangements,
which were put in place by means of a mutually beneficial transaction between the
royal government and private enterpreneurs. The crown temporarily transfered its
claims to the labor of the Indians to encomenderos, who in exchange payed some
taxes and assumed responsibility for providing defense and social services.
Encomenderos accepted the exchange because they had a comparative advantage
vis-a-vis the crown in extracting labor from their charges and consuming what it
produced. In addition, they had gathered substantial military experience during the
12
conquest ami could organize themselves into an effective militia to dcfcndlhe
colony.
The encomiendas musl be viewed as an unmua! form of lax-farming lhnl
allowed hoth partners in the trans<lelion to share the rents accruing to roY<llly owned
scarce labor resources. They were also a discriminatory system of labor allocation
which its benefici\lries had incentives to preserve and tbose it discriminated against
had incentives t~ reform. Given the defense needs of the seventeenth century, and
the later demand for indigenous labor of state enterprises, it should not be
surprising that the encomiendas persisted while colonial rule lasted. Conversely,
given that by the early nineteenth century, the great majority of Paraguayans were
peasants without encomiendas one would have expected the encomiendas to have
been abolished afler Independence, as in fact they were. Conditions leading to the
abolition of the encomienda in Paraguay, therefore, Seem to have arisen from the
internal logic of existing economic conditions, and resemble those to which Domar
attributed the non recurrence of serfdom in England.
Consider now the free mestizo peasantry. Due to the absence of
immigration. mestizos occupied the position of "criollos:' Indies-born children of
Spaniards, although public office and encomiendas were preferentially assigned to
peninsular Spaniards nevertheless. Thus, after the first encomiendas were
distributed, mestizos left Asuncion for areas to the north and east, where there were
relatively large concentrations of still unentmsted Indians, who could be subjected
to the encomienda mitaria or enslaved. Once the still unentrusted population
disappeared, however, the mestizos had to rely on their own labor and the still
abundant land for a livelihood, that is, they became peasants. As the scarcity of
labor became even more pronounced and th~ encomiendas st;lgnated, mestizos
were not entrusted because they were legally ineligible for subjection. Thus. it was
the government's intervention 10 enforce property rights that allowed a free
13
peasantry to remain free when economic forces would have led to its bonding.
Summarizing t11CI1, becausc the government entrusted Indian labor to a fraction of
the Spaniards, confined the indigenolls population to rescrvations, and allowed
Spaniard.~ and mestizos to privately own [anll, there simultaneously emerged
indigenous serfs, non-working landowners, and free mestizo peasants. A pattern
whose appearance Domar deemed impossible did in fact appear. That is. the
discriminatory assignment and enforcement by the government of private property
rights over labor and land to permit the state and individuals to share the rents of
scarce labor resources resulted in a class structure and land tenure system of
particular ethnic characteristics.
On the basis of the previous discussion, preliminary statement of the
reformulated hypothesis would read something like this: assuming homogeneous
land and abundant, evenly fertile land, a free peasantry will arise so long as private
property rights over all resources are clearly defined and enforced by a government
financed from direct or indirect taxes levied on the peasants themselves. Provided
land remains abundant and evenly fertile, the introduction of a third factor, capital,
will not significantly alter the results. Governmental restriction of the right to own
land to a certain section of the population will result in a class of landowners and a
class of rural wage laborers, and the public finance structure will be correspondingly
altered. If labor is scarce but land is abundant and evenly fertile and property rights
over all resources are assigned to the government but are not well defined or
enforced by it, maximizing behavior will lead private agents with superior coercive
capabilities to enslave a militarily inferior population and extract the surplus over
subsistence that it can produce. TIle attempt to enslave lahorers will result i~ a
reduction of the population from among which the slaves are ohtained, in a manner
akin to that predicted by the theory of common property resourtes. The resource
depletion and rent dissip:ltion may move the government to intervene to preserve
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the resource and extract the rents accruing to it, provided the returns from doing so
are anticipated to outweigh the costs. Preserving the resource implics protecting thc
lahorers, which will require the government to separate encroachers and laborers.
Extracting labor rents will require the government to implement :l rent-sharing
agreement, that is, farm out the collection of labor rents in exchange for the
provision of cert~in public goods. To this effect, the government will tie laborers to
the tax farmers and confine laborers to their settlements, that is, restrict competition
for laborers and labor mobility. Alternatively, the government may use thc labor
resources in its own enterprises. Wbich option is chosen will depend on the
government's public finance alternatives, tbe cost of providing defense, the price of
labor, and its capability to steer business ventures. In either case, government
restrictions on the right to own land and labor will be necessary. Should restrictions
be made along ethnic lines, the resulting class differences and land tenure system
will exhibit similar ethnic characteristics as well.
The bonded population, because it is deprived of a greater or lesser part of
the surplus over subsistence that it produces, is likely to grow at a slower rate than
the mestizo peasantry. As bonded labor becomes relatively more scarce,
landowners with labor grants will diminish as a proportion of the population, and so
will the pressures they may put on the government to maintain a discriminatory
system of labor allocation. Conversely, as the free peasantry becomes a greater
proportion of the total population, incentives will increase for it to favor the
abolition of the entrustment system, and the growing peasant influence on the
government may lead to the abolition of serfdom. However, should the government
have reclaimed the labor grants it made originally, it will resist peasant pressures for
abolition. In this case, if the peasantry itself cannot prevail on the government, the
increase in population may cause the government to regard emerging land rents as a
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profitable substitute for tax revenes based on declining labor rents, and serfdom
may be abolishing nevertheless.
5. To lest tIle reformulatcd hypothesis we must establish its capability to
[\ccounl for features of Paraguay's colonial economy other than those which
prompted the reformulation. At least three such instances may be mentioned. First,
the fact that as the encomicndas stagnated early in the seventeenth century, the
crown exempted Jesuit mission Indians from the encomiendas and refused several
requests by encomenderos to cancel that exemption; second, that the crown also
prohibited the importation of African slaves to replenish the dwindling supply of
Indian labor; and, third, that in the eighteenth century, as the crown granted no new
encomiendas and retook possession of those whose terms had ended, its share of
defense duties increased.
The Indian population of Jesuit mission towns grew rapidly from their
inception. By contrast, that of Franciscan missions did not begin to grow until the
18th. century and then only very slowly. Furthermore, under tbe direction of their
Jesuit mentors, mission Indians contributted effectively to defcnse and, in addition,
paid their taxes in money, punctually to boot. When Indians were congregated in
missions under Jesuit oversight, segregated from Spaniards, and exempted from the
encomienda, the stock of indigenous labor yielded much higher returns than it did
when confined to towns under Franciscan supervision, less isolated from Spaniards,
and subjected to the encomienda. The crown had no reason, then to yield to
encomenderos and reimpose the encomicnda on Jesuit mission Indians, and did not. T
hat as the encomienda stagnated the crown should have forbidden encomenderos to
import African slaves is aho consistent with the hypothesis.lbd encomenderos
been allowed to imporl African slaves they would have switched from encomienda
labor to African slave labor; the defeme committments they owed under the
encomicnda would have been correspondingly reduced. By forbidding the
importation of African slaves the crown reduced the encomenderos' ability to
substitute African for Indian forced labor and constrained them to adhere to their
original defense committments. Finally, the encomenderos contrihution to defense
decreased in the eighteenth century, as the crown granted no new encomiendas and
retook possession of those whose term had ended. As one would have expected, the
crown's share of defense duties increased concommitantly. The old system by which
the colonial administration obtained contributions to defense from individuals in
exchange for grants of labor was scrapped. Instead, a military reform installed a
semi professional army remunerated by the crown in money, not in labor, in land, or
both.
In conclusion, Domar's emphasis on relative labor scarcity vis-a-vis land as a
contributing cause of agricultural slavery or serfdom is thou roughly warranted. His
identification of slavery and serfdom, however, is not. Despite the similarities
between both these forms of coerced labor, there are sufficient diferences between
them to justify dealing with them separately. The case studied here suggests that
whether relative labor scarcity vis-a·vis land results in slavery or in serfdom
depends on the degree to which the state enforces property rights, which in turn will
depend on the rate of return to the state of investing its scarce resources in that
activity as compared to others. In Paraguay, indigenous slavery emerged when the
state did not enforce its private property rights over the labor of indigenous people
and allowed its peninsular subjects to regard indigenous people as a common
property resource. Exploitation by private entrepreneurs of crown-owned Indian
labor along common property resource lines led to the depletion of the resource and
the dissipation of rents that should have accrued to the crown. As the resource
became more scarce and, therefore, more valuable, and to prevent further depletion
and rent-dissipation, the crown sought to regulate the exploitation of Indian labor by
mean.... of the encomienda and the congregacion. These regulatory institutions had
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features very similar to schemes for managing open access fisheres. They were
intended to curtail acces to the resource and the dissipation of rent it could yield to
the crown. However, the system did not work wellU:Ilillndians were congregated in
Jesuit missions, segregated from Spaniards and, in addition. exempted from the
encomiendas. The growth of a mestizo population legally exempt from the
encomiendas in time made labor relatively more abundant and land comparatively
more scarce, a tendency that was exacerbated when the Borbonic reforms increased
foreign trade and immigration. As land and foreign trade replaced labor as the
state's predominant source of tax revenues, the encomiendao; were abandoned in
favor of other institutional arrangements by which the state sought to obtain
revenues and provide defense.
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